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Page 2 of telegram to BORN, LORDOW, PARTS RETO HOSCOW, BERLIE HISTORIA

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we and Allies would start taking certain measures military preparedness in line with contingency plans which now under active review U3 lovt. After Soviet rejection US proposal for contentious litigation, we would then consider going into Security Council, as likewise contemplated in contingency plans, seeking both cease and desist order and request by council for advisory opinion from Court on legal issue involved. If, as unticipated, Soviets weto such request, then consideration would be given to going into General Assembly and repeating same process, except that Soviet veto would not apply. While this taking place Western Powers would have numerous opportunities to make speeches, propagandize and win wide public support for their position on Berlin. Idea would be to keep Soviets on defensive, and on assumption some country bound in any event bring Berlin issue into UN once it begins approach critical point, course of action proposed would enable Western Powers to keep better control of situation by having problem arise in UN on our terms. Kohler stressed that Court would of course not be asked to adjudicate fact of Western rights in Berlin but Soviet claim that by its unilateral action those rights can be extinguished.

Ensuing discussion showed considerable interest in possibility such Western initiative, though agreed this would represent important policy step which would require careful prior consideration by govts.

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Kohler commented
that there was pretty strong feeling in Washington that this time we were moving
toward real confrontation with Soviets over Berlin and that Soviet aide-memoirs .as
opening gun,
We had for obvious reasons maintained relative silence on question since $\mathbb{A}_{\mathcal{Q}} \subset \mathbb{A}_{\mathcal{Q}}$
while Soviets continued propagate their QTE peace treaty UNQTE and QTE free city U.N.
mambits. However felt that we must now get into more positive general posture and
view to developing political, propaganda and deterrent campaign which we would as gre-
ared to sustain from now to end of year.
In response to query as to whether all-Berlin alternative on the
given equal weight, personal view those present was that, while this subject to
further consideration by govts, main attention should be on Court proposal.
2. German Reply to Soviet Memorandum of February 17
After considerable dispussion text of reply agreed Commans noted however and
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AUCST had indicated man it wished propose some additional language which would require meeting of Four Power Lorking Broup next week. It was also a greed that final form of lemman response sould really only be determined when basic decisions made as to content V3 reply to aide-memorize of June h.

Kohler observed one merit of early reply was that it would out off speculation on possible weakening our position.

only substantive point of importance in discussion German reply has whether specific language chould be included in response to Soviet charge of German militarism, capability as in earlier draft, that FedRep does not seek independent nuclear manufactor or transfer of nuclear weapons to national jurisdiction.

momoire, as in draft under discussion, considered desirable as statement of fact which US would be in position to make.

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3. <u>Contingracy</u>

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## Caderipleages:

## Contingency Planning

This subject discussed only bilaterally and tripartitely. Kohler noted that subject presently under intensive review in US lovt and that we hoped shortly to come up with some fairly specific proposals to heighten effectiveness of Western deterrent in Lerlin situation. He stressed US feeling, which conveyed to both British and French on previous occasions, that US felt probe contemplated on too small a scale to prove anything and that action to reopen access required greater commitment of Western forces as well as firm decisions by govts to planning and execution of courses of action.

## 4. Procedures

Smackburgs, laloy and obler agreed that meeting of three at one of capitals extending for In-day period wight be desirable toward end of July to attempt the together various stands of allied planning both re contingency planning and tactics and substance for next round with Soviets. No decision taken in this matter, but a greenent was general that some sort of working group session as prior to Geneva Conference 1959 and Summit Conference 1960 would probably be necessary, whether or not West attempting

move



move toward negotiations with Soviets prior to threatened peace treaty action.

Question of German participation such meeting raised but not decided, although US vides is that this essential. Kohler also urged full German participation in Washington.

Ambassadorial Group and closer association with LIVE CAK exercise.

Full memoranda of conversation being pouched.

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